PX 66-20:93 27 octobre 1962 site de lancement de missiles balistiques à moyenne portée 3, San Cristobal, Cuba. Image utilisée dans la séance d'information du Secrétaire de la Défense, 6 février 1963. Veuillez indiquer « États-Unis. Ministère de la Défense. Ministère de la Défense documents d'information sur la crise des missiles de Cuba. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston »
4000 x 3348 px | 33,9 x 28,3 cm | 13,3 x 11,2 inches | 300dpi
Date de la prise de vue:
6 février 1963
Lieu:
Cuba
Informations supplémentaires:
Cette image appartient au domaine public, ce qui signifie que le droit d’auteur a expiré ou que le titulaire du droit d’auteur a renoncé à ses droits. Les frais facturés par Alamy couvrent l’accès à la copie haute résolution de l’image.
Cette image peut avoir des imperfections car il s’agit d’une image historique ou de reportage.
The Cuban Missile Crisis, also known as the October Crisis of 1962 , the Caribbean Crisis or the Missile Scare, was a 1 month, 4 day (16 October – 20 November 1962) confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union which escalated into an international crisis when American deployments of missiles in Italy and Turkey were matched by Soviet deployments of similar ballistic missiles in Cuba. Despite the short time frame, the Cuban Missile Crisis remains a defining moment in U.S. national security and nuclear war preparation. The confrontation is often considered the closest the Cold War came to escalating into a full-scale nuclear war. In response to the presence of American Jupiter ballistic missiles in Italy and Turkey, and the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961, Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev agreed to Cuba's request to place nuclear missiles on the island to deter a future invasion. An agreement was reached during a secret meeting between Khrushchev and Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro in July 1962, and construction of a number of missile launch facilities started later that summer. Meanwhile, the 1962 United States elections were under way, and the White House denied charges for months that it was ignoring dangerous Soviet missiles 90 mi (140 km) from Florida. The missile preparations were confirmed when an Air Force U-2 spy plane produced clear photographic evidence of medium-range R-12 (NATO code name SS-4) and intermediate-range R-14 (NATO code name SS-5) ballistic missile facilities. When this was reported to President John F. Kennedy he then convened a meeting of the nine members of the National Security Council and five other key advisers in a group that became known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM). During this meeting, President Kennedy was originally advised to carry out an air strike.
